Ameliorative Philosophy before Kant
To put it bluntly, German philosophers from Leibniz to Lessing did not delimit in advance what philosophy is capable of and not capable of. While they were keen to define what philosophy ought to become, they refused to determine what philosophy is. It is this failure to set limits which Kant finds so objectionable: for Kant, it reveals a wider tendency to disregard reality, to refuse to think the facts as they actually are.
3 However, the widespread tendency in the Leibniz- The sign is the vehicle which the mind passes through on the way to the thing itself, when that thing cannot be immediate intuited. It is a means to an end. Symbolic cognition is therefore attenuated knowledge, distanced from what is known by the mediation of the sign.
On the one hand, this distance can be an advantage in allowing the subject to gain knowledge of what is not immediately present to her, and it is for this reason that most human knowledge in its current state is symbolic. On the other hand, it is precisely this distance which is the source of error. Intuition is indubitable because it is immediately connected to its object which appears before the mind's eye in its full splendour; in such conditions, there is no possibility of misjudgement. It is only when such splendour is dimmed by an intermediary (which, moreover, could easily be mistaken for the thing itself) that error becomes possible.
Moses Mendelssohn writes, for example, that in symbolic cognition the 'powers of the mind are deceived since they frequently forget the signs and believe themselves to be catching sight of the subject matter itself.' 9 Signs generate error. Wolff and those that follow him therefore stand firmly within a philosophical heritage which privileges intuition over mediated knowledge.
Therefore -and this is crucial for what follows -as well as being descriptive, this distinction between intuitive and symbolic cognition is also normative. It is not the case that
Wolff and his followers are merely analysing the current state of human knowledge, they are also making claims about how knowledge ought to be. They therefore (as we shall see)
formulate rules to achieve this end. While symbolic cognition exists at present, it does not possess any intrinsic value. It should be eliminated -and the philosophers in the LeibnizWolffian tradition saw their task precisely in terms of the elimination of symbolic cognition and the consequent attainment of the ideal of pure intuition. This is what I intend to describe with the term 'amelioration': pre-Kantian German philosophers were not content merely to describe what is; they attempted to bring about what ought to be. They set about improving knowledge by means of the philosophical rule: 'turn all symbolic cognition into intuitive cognition!'
Rules
The elimination of all symbolic cognition, it was claimed, would put man in possession of an infallible and universal science; knowledge would be immediately of the things themselves, unmediated by the sign, and yet not limited to the finitely perceptible.
Man would gain God's infinite and indubitable power of perception. More concretely, language -and the linguistic sign in particular -was usually considered the site on which this conversion or elimination should occur, for it is the sign that separates symbolic from intuitive cognition. The imperative for the Wolffians therefore became to dissolve the sign without destroying science. The ideal was self-negating or transparent language -a system of signs which allows the mind to behold the thing itself as if it were an intuition. [**Spinoza is an uneasy ancestor to this view, as an anonymous reviewer of this paper pointed out. On the one hand, the more geometrico seems to offer an example of precisely such an ideal language; however, on the other hand, he consigns mathematics to merely fictional status in aspect of the rationalist tradition has more discredited it in the eyes of posterity than its emphasis on rules.' 12 In regard to the sciences and to philosophy itself (although not in regard to the arts on which Beiser focuses), the basis for this dismissive attitude is the supposed failure of rule-givers to pay attention to the conditions which prevent discourses from instantiating these rules -obsessed with what ought to be, they become blind to what actually exists and the reasons why it exists. 13 There is, of course, much truth to this concern; however, far from invalidating any recourse to rules, it merely insists upon their appropriate, realistic application.
Philosophical rules, I have argued, are applied in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition to both philosophy itself and other arts and sciences. One must, therefore, distinguish between these two types of rule: the internal, self-reflexive rule for the amelioration of philosophical 10 Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, II.3, 406. 11 Beiser, Diotima's Children, Beiser, Diotima's Children, 11. 13 In the aesthetic domain, rules supposedly conflict with artistic creativity and the non-conceptual nature of the artwork.
discourse and the external rule for the amelioration of other discourses. In other words, Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology did not merely give rules for the improvement of pure, theoretical knowledge (along the lines of early modern methodology), but also gave rules for technical forms of knowing (the know-how required for crafts and activities). The amelioration of 'applied' knowledge is a central ambition of these philosophers. Indeed, in
Leibniz-Wolffian epistemology, the very hierarchy between theoretical contemplation and practical know-how begins to break down, for the philosopher's relation to both is identical:
she sets rules for the amelioration of discourse -whatever the discourse. Philosophy is practical in every domain. Application or praxis is not an afterthought, but the very essence of what it is to do epistemology.
An illuminating example of a rule philosophy applies to itself is Leibniz' ars characteristica (and all the projects for a universal language that followed in its wake Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 166. 16 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 166. No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead us away from the things themselves; on the contrary, it leads us into the interior of things… Since the analysis of concepts thus corresponds exactly to the analysis of a character, we need merely to see the characters in order to have adequate notions brought to our mind freely and without effort. We can hope for no greater aid than this in the perfection of the mind.
17
The key phrase is 'without effort': whereas the arbitrary sign erects a barrier between mind and world which cognition has to break down, Leibnizian characters bring the world 'adequately' into the mind. It is as if there were no mediation at all. Symbolic cognition is putatively transformed into intuition, hence there is no possibility of misjudgement. The ars characteristica perfects language to the point that it no longer acts like language. What is more, Wolff later interprets this aspect of the ars characteristica precisely in terms of the normative requirement to transform symbolism into intuition: 'By virtue of the ars characteristica combinatoria symbolic cognition is converted as it were into an intuitive cognition, even in those cases where a distinct intuitive cognition cannot ordinarily be attained.' 18
Poetics
The ars characteristica is therefore an example of the rules by which philosophers legislate in their own domain. In this next section, I consider the way in which LeibnizWolffian philosophers prescribed rules to other disciplines -in particular, to poets. The normative interpretation of symbolic cognition plays an identical role -the only difference is the type of knowing it now regulates. 17 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 193 . 18 Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, II.5, §312; translated in Wellbery, Lessing's Laocoon, 40. ideas provide the subject with the certainty of what something is without however being able to explain why it is. 20 In consequence, they are associated with empirical sense data.
21
Through the senses, one can perceive an object, represent it correctly and judge it correctly, but one cannot answer the question why it is so. Clarity -as defined by Leibniz -is inferior to distinctness, a stage on the way to science. However, as the eighteenth century progressed, there developed an increasing curiosity in clear ideas for their own sake. It was this impetus to treat empirical ideas on their own terms which ultimately led Baumgarten in the mideighteenth century to the formulation of aesthetics. It was Baumgarten's self-imposed task in his Aesthetics and Reflections on Poetry to formulate a 'science of perception' 22 to isolate empirical ideas from scientific ones and analyse them in their own right. There thus emerged a field of philosophy proper to the sensible, which possessed a criterion of perfection separate from science proper -beauty. Aesthetics is therefore a branch of epistemology: the science of intuited clear ideas; and beauty is the most perfect clear idea, independent of any relationship to distinctness. 23 Clarity here obtains autonomy.
As this idea of perfection already implies, once again philosophers were not concerned merely with describing our sensible ideas, but with ameliorating them, with formulating the rules and principles by which empirical cognition can be perfected. Beauty or perfect sensuous presentation was the end towards which pre-Kantian aestheticians laboured:
'The end of aesthetics is the perfection of sensuous cognition which, however, as such is epistemological project. As Gottsched put it, 'Everything comes down to a science of rules.'
27
Just as in general the philosopher gives rules for improving knowledge, so too she gives rules to make poetry beautiful.
It is worth exploring one concrete example of a rule aestheticians formulated for the conversion of symbolic into intuitive poetry. This rule makes recourse to natural sign theory, and reads in short: 'convert arbitrary signs into natural ones!' The natural sign is a linguistic symbol which does not exhibit the disadvantages of symbolic cognition, but rather putatively gives rise to intuitive cognition (just like Leibniz's ars characteristica). Natural signs seem to do the impossible (they are both beautiful and linguistic) and for this reason become one end aestheticians prescribe to poets.
Mendelssohn's distinction between arbitrary and natural signs reads thus,
The signs by means of which an object is expressed can be either natural or arbitrary.
They are natural if the combination of the sign with the subject matter signified is grounded in the very properties of what is designated… Those signs, on the other hand, that by their very nature have nothing in common with the designated subject matter, but that have nonetheless been arbitrarily assumed as signs for it, are called "arbitrary".
28
The difference rests on the type of connection between sign and referent: arbitrary signs have a merely conventional relationship instituted by the free choice of the subject. Almost all language for eighteenth-century philosophers was arbitrary and such arbitrariness gave rise to the very epistemological errors explored earlier in regard to symbolic cognition. We also have the practice of bringing two entities together as we please -entities which otherwise would not come together -and making one the sign of the other.
Such signs are called arbitrary signs… Words belong among the arbitrary signs: for that a word and an idea are present together at the same time or that one of the two follows upon the other rests on our free choice.
29
Since the sign does not resemble its referent, its referent cannot be truly perceived from the sign alone. Due to its conventional nature, the sign obscures what it marks; it can thus give rise to error. 30 Such is language's fundamental limitation: it often leaves the mind stranded at the level of signs without access to the thing it should be cognising. In this way, science is impeded.
With natural signs, however, there is an objective reason for the choice of sign: the sign is naturally grounded in the thing itself. 31 Mendelssohn's example is onomatopoeia: 'A poet frequently makes use of words and syllables whose natural sound has a similarity with the designated subject matter.' 32 Such onomatopoeic sounds are natural signs, because there is a natural connection between their own being and that of the referent. This is not a connection dreamed up and imposed by the subject, but one objectively already there, preexisting the subject (who merely discovers and articulates it). Natural signs follow naturally from their referent and so avoid the pitfalls of symbolic cognition. The natural sign is not an intermediary which obscures the referent and thus needs to be concealed; it is an epistemological aid rather than a hindrance. In Schiller's 1795 On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry, this normative demand to destroy language is further embedded in a teleological genealogy. Both ancient and modern poetry are found wanting, so only a poet of the future will be able to finally overcome the limitations of the linguistic sign, overcome the paradox of poetry and make poetry beautiful.
That is, instead of prescribing rules to contemporary poets for this end, as pre-Kantian aestheticians had done, Schiller invokes a genius-to-come. He writes, 45 Schiller, 'Kallias', 179. 46 Schiller, 'Kallias', If to the [moderns] the sign remains forever heterogeneous and alien to the thing signified, to the [future poet] language springs as by some inner necessity out of thought and is so at one with it that even beneath the corporeal frame the spirit appears as if laid bare. It is precisely this mode of expression in which the sign disappears in the thing signified.
47
The poet of the future will invent a new kind of language in order to ensure her poetry is beautiful. In such future language, sign and referent will not remain 'forever heterogeneous and alien', but fuse together as one. The referent is absorbed into the sign. Although such a conception of language anticipates the romantic symbol, its most obvious precedent is the natural sign. At present, sign and referent are disconnected, in the future they will be onesuch is Schiller's version of the pre-Kantian rule, 'convert arbitrary signs into natural ones!'
Schiller maps such amelioration onto history: the future will be an improvement on the present, since beautiful poetry will then be possible.
Schiller therefore resurrects the paradox of poetry; he reattaches it to an ameliorative process of transforming arbitrary signs into natural ones, and so hands these pre-Kantian modes of thought down to his Romantic and Idealist heirs. Yet, even here, Maimon surreptitiously and subtly alters the idea of symbolic cognition. As we have seen, for Wolff and his successors, symbolic cognition is knowledge of an object through the intermediary of a sign. For Maimon, however, symbolic cognition is knowledge of a sign instead of an object. He argues that since 'signs are signs only because they lead to the representation of things' (ETP 140), then insofar as we know these signs as representing things, there is little difference between such symbolic cognition and intuitive cognition. Of course, this is precisely what philosophers in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition would reject, for to know a thing via its sign is to know it in a mediated manner. Nonetheless, Maimon continues that pure symbolic cognition -symbolic cognition that is opposed to intuitive cognition -must occur when 'only the representation of the sign is present, without the representation of the thing' (ETP 141). Symbolic cognition is cognition of the sign in itself (to the extent that it does not refer). Maimon's conception is therefore much stronger than Wolff's or Baumgarten's, for Maimonian symbolic cognition does not have every sign as its object, only those signs whose referent is inaccessible intuitively.
Maimon
While the above can be considered a debate within the parameters set by the LeibnizWolffian tradition, three pages into the appendix there occurs a sharp change in direction.
Maimon begins to interpret symbolic cognition through the lens of transcendental philosophy.
More specifically, he reads the intuitive/symbolic dichotomy onto Kant's distinction between the matter and form of experience. That is, at this juncture, Maimon, on the one hand, makes explicitly clear his dissatisfaction with traditional Leibniz-Wolffian discourse about symbolic cognition: it determines symbolic cognition 'merely by means of a subjective ground… [it] does not determine an object' (ETP 141). And, on the other hand, he introduces Kantian terminology to overcome this dissatisfaction:
An object of cognition is a unity that is thought by the understanding in the manifold; the manifold is the given, or the matter; but the unity is the form that connects the matter of the manifold. (ETP 141)
Maimon continues by claiming that matter (the manifold and forms of intuition) and form (categories and concepts, i.e. forms of the understanding) can only be experienced on the condition that they are synthesised in an object: 'In this way we are in a position to have intuitive cognition not only of the object, but also, in and through this object, to have intuitive cognition of its matter in itself and its form in itself' (ETP 142). When I experience a table, I
experience the form and matter that constitute the table. However, Maimon is insistent, 'This is the only way we can ever have intuitive cognition of the form' (ETP 142). I cannot intuit the form of the table (the categories and concepts which structure it) as form independently of the matter of experience. This does not mean that forms do not exist outside of their synthesis with matter; rather, insofar as a philosopher is aware of forms in themselves, she cognises them symbolically:
In this case therefore we find ourselves forced to think of something of which we have no intuitive cognition as a real object, so that we can represent it only by means of signs, and hence it comprises an object of symbolic cognition. (ETP 142) Forms of the understanding exist, yet are inaccessible to intuition; therefore, they are objects of symbolic cognition. The whole transcendental machinery of the understanding is solely cognisable symbolically. That is, since these forms so crucial to the transcendental Moreover, in consequence, the ameliorative vocation for philosophy which was so central to the pre-Kantian employment of symbolic cognition now reappears reinserted into a transcendental framework. Maimon translates the Kantian requirement for the categories to 50 The vocabulary of 'symbolic concepts being made intuitive' is very similar to terminology Kant also uses. Kant always portrays Darstellungen (for example) as structures of thought which must attain objective reality, which must themselves be expressed in intuition in order for experience to be possible. On the Progress of Metaphysics includes a section entitled, 'How to Confer Objective Reality on the Pure Concepts of Understanding and Reason', in which Kant writes, 'To represent a pure concept of the understanding as thinkable in an object of possible experience is to confer objective reality upon it and in general to present it.
Where we are unable to achieve this, the concept is empty, i.e. it suffices for no knowledge.' (I. Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. H. Allison and P. Heath, trans. G. Hatfield et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20:279.) Maimon mirrors this vocabulary through the lens of symbolic cognition. So, just as for Kant Darstellungen need to attain objective reality and express themselves in a corresponding intuition for experience to be possible, so too do symbolic forms need to attain objective reality and so become intuitive for experience to be possible.
attain objective reality into the pre-Kantian 'demand that a merely symbolic concept be made intuitive' (ETP 35). As such, Maimon's recovery of symbolic cognition is not merely descriptive, it plays a transformative role as well: symbolic cognition should be eliminated.
Normativity stands at the heart of his epistemology.
Kant and Descriptive Philosophy
If the above puts to rest the idea that normative epistemology is dead after Kant, it gives rise to pressing questions concerning Kant's own relation to the ameliorative tradition.
There is no room in this paper for a full discussion of the fate of theoretical philosophy's The first indication of Kant's distance from an ameliorative paradigm is to be found in his characterisation of transcendental arguments. Kant shifts philosophy's focus away from experience itself to the conditions of experience and hence away from evaluating that experience to legitimating it. He writes, 'I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.' 52 Transcendental philosophy neglects the task of cognising objects in favour of cognising the conditions of such first-order cognition; in so doing, it not only assumes that there is such first-order cognition, but also -and this is what is crucial -that there should be.
53
The structure of transcendental arguments makes this second assumption clear. Their premise is always an experiential fact ('X') from which certain conditions are shown to be necessary, leading to the conclusion: 'If X, then conditions A and B necessarily hold.' The very point of the experiential fact is that it is to be so uncontroversial (experience of temporal succession, for example) as to be putatively indubitable. However, of course, this indubitability is not argued for, but rather assumed. From Maimon through to Stroud, this has been a recurrent objection against transcendental arguments: namely that they take experience for granted -and to this extent beg the question. 54 What is more, transcendental philosophers also ascribe certain properties to this experience: it does not, for example, exist in flux, but is stable enough to be referred to as a discrete and determinable 'fact'. It is also neutral or value-free -that is, the philosopher is debarred from asking whether inquiry into the conditions of X is worth being pursued. The value of X is bracketed. the possibility of normative rules: the world is to be described, not altered.
The Fate of Symbolic Cognition in Kant's Philosophy
The second indication of the priority given to description above amelioration can be discerned from the fate of symbolic cognition in Kant's critical works. 59 Kant here wages a battle on two fronts: on the one hand, he redefines the symbol (as intuitive) in a way that thoroughly distances it from its Leibniz-Wolffian heritage; on the other hand, he consigns discursive mediation to the role of mere characterisation. Such mediation, he contends, has nothing to do with knowledge:
Signs contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object; their point is the subjective one of serving as a means for reproducing concepts… They are either words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, and they merely express concepts. 60 Signs are subjective, arbitrary aids for communicating concepts -a role of no philosophical importance. The sign has nothing to do with epistemology, but is solely a device for communicating already processed philosophical thought; therefore, there is no such thing as knowledge gained solely through discourse according to Kant. In this passage from the third Critique, symbolic cognition disappears from philosophy.
Indeed, this is also the implication of the famous dictum from the first Critique, concepts without intuitions are 'empty'. 61 
Conclusion
When it comes to normative epistemology, Kant's Copernican Revolution is not the final word. There remain strong lines of continuity between pre-and post-Kantian German philosophy. Maimon and Schiller reintroduce an ameliorative imperative according to which philosophy labours to improve discourse; more specifically, theoretical philosophy is not only concerned with what is, but also with what should be. Philosophy can improve our knowledge and prescribing rules for the elimination of symbolic cognition is part of that ameliorative process, for pre-and post-Kantians alike. In sum, epistemology applies rules, for it consists first and foremost in the praxis of ameliorating knowledge of all types.
